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JURISDICTION
Appellant George E. Brown, Jr., appeals the summary judgment dismissing Appellees,
seven employees of American Fork City. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
A.

Issue

In granting summary judgment, did the trial court correctly conclude the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act §§ 63-30-1, et seq., bars Brown's defamation and emotional
distress claims against the employees?
B.

Standard of Review

Summaiy judgment presents only a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Ryan
v. Dan's Foods, 972 P.2d 395, 400 (Utah 1998).
GOVERNING LAW
The Petition Clause of the First Amendment bars plaintiffs claim. U.S. Const,
amend. 1; See also Utah Const. Art. I § 1. Various statutory bars to his claims are embodied
in the Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 63-30-10(2), 63-30-10(5) and 63-30-4(3) and (4)
(1953, as amended.) Rule 9(b), Utah R. Civ. P. is also relevant and is set forth in the
Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
INTRODUCTION.
This is a political dispute that has no business in court. It is brought by lawyer
Brown, a former city councilman, against seven city employees for petitioning the city
council to address Brown's erratic behavior. It was dismissed because the First Amendment
to the Constitution guarantees the employees every right to petition their government for
redress of grievances. This Constitutional right is the foundation for the provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act that provide three independent statutory bars to Brown's action.
The dismissal should be affirmed.
A.

Nature of the Case, Coarse of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Mr. Brown was an erratic councilman for American Fork City. After several public
incidents, forty-five city employees petitioned the City Council to do something about
Mr. Brown. The Council considered the grievance, but did not take any formal action.
Mr. Brown retaliated and sued seven of the forty-five, alleging defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. He also sued newspapers and their reporters for reporting,
inter alia, about the grievance. All defendants moved for summary judgment.

The

newspaper defendants were dismissed because the reported information was true, was not
defamatory, and was protected by the public interest and fair reporting privileges. Plaintiff
did not appeal that dismissal.
The city employees were also dismissed, the court holding three separate provisions
on the Governmental Immunity Act barred plaintiffs claims:
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1.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1953, as amended) prohibits claims arising out

of "abuse of power, libel, slander" and "infliction of mental anguish." This bars both the
defamation and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
2.

The grievance was the initiation of an administrative proceeding against

Mr. Brown, so defendants are immune under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(5), which bars
claims arising out of "the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause." Utah CodeAnn. § 63-30-10(5)
(1953, as amended.)
3.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b) (1953, as amended), the action against

the employees are barred because there is no evidence that the employees "acted or failed
to act throughfraudor malice." The grievance, on its face, does not constitute legal malice
under Utah law.
B.

Statement of Facts.

Brown fails to meet his burden of showing that the trial court ignored issues of
*

material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. He fails to recite those facts
with specificity or explain how they are material. This Court should accept the trial court's
ruling that the material facts were undisputed, and review only the accuracy of the trial
court's application of the law to the facts.
1.

Brown's Facts Are Not Evidence.

The great majority of Brown's twelve pages of facts are irrelevant. They have nothing
to do with whether the Petition Clause of the First Amendment and the Governmental
3

Immunity Act bars his claims. Moreover, most of Brown's asserted facts are either hearsay
or conclusory allegations. They are not evidence. He gives a narrative history of his tenure
as a City Council member, including how people were out to get him, and how he thinks they
tried to remove him from office. He attempts to justify yelling at a former City employee.
He tries prove that because a City phone bill shows a telephone call to a number he asserts
belonged to the Salt Lake Tribune, that someone faxed something, impliedly the grievance,
to the Salt Lake Tribune.
He explains how newspaper reporters called him to question him about police reports
involving alleged incidents of misconduct by Brown, how he was wrongly accused, and his
unsuccessful attempts to obtain the pohce investigation files through GRAMA requests. He
details alleged violations of GRAMA laws, which he did not assert in his Complaint and
which are the subject of other litigation. He alleges the City's police chief improperly
disclosed to the newspaper defendants police reports involving him. Yet, he did not name
the chief as a defendant. He even recites verbatim a letter to the editor published in the
American Fork Citizen newspaper as evidence of his good actions at City Hall. None of
these so-called facts relate in any way to the allegedly defamatory statements in the
grievance.
Much of Brown's "citations to the record" are not cites to admissible evidence. For
example, the first three pages of his Statement of Facts, Brown repeatedly cites as evidence
the introduction section of his memorandum in opposition to the Newspaper Defendants'
motion for summary judgment. [Brown brief, pp. 4-6.] He cites to multiple affidavits he
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filed, the majority of them his own, comprised of inadmissible hearsay, opinions and legal
conclusions. (See employees Motion to Strike, R. 973-984.)

He relies on newspaper

articles as evidence. He cites an opinion letter and a GRAMA decision that are wholly
irrelevant. He even cites allegations in his Complaint as evidence. Brown's Statement of
Facts is unreliable and not based on the record.
2.

Undisputed Facts Supporting Summary Judgment.

Brown was a member of the American Fork City Council at all relevant times.
(R. 36.) During his term as a City Council member, he verbally and physically abused
numerous employees of the City. (R. 864, 868, 872.) He yelled at one employee about an
item she placed on the agenda for a City Council meeting. The employee broke down into
tears. (R. 864 868, 872.) He repeatedly threatened other city employees in a violent manner
causing them to fear for their safety and the safety of others. (R. 864.) Brown often sneered
at female employees. (R. 860.) He even tried to humiliate an American Fork City citizen
at a City Council meeting by dismissing a question asked by the citizen, because the citizen's
wife was one of several employees who filed a class action lawsuit against Brown. (R. 857.)
On June 24, 1997, a city employee voiced his opinion about City matters during a
City Council meeting. (R. 853-54.) The following day, Brown confronted him and
instructed him never to stand up in City Council and make derogatory comments again.
(R 853-54.) The City Administrator, who witnessed Brown's verbal attack on the employee,
told Brown to stop threatening City workers. (R. 851.)
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Thereafter, American Fork City police received a report that Brown was out of control
at City Hall. An officer and a lieutenant responded and saw the city employee that Brown
had attacked leaving the building. They asked what happened. (R. 843-49.) While they
wrere talking, Brown came out and tried to tell the employee what to WTite in his statement
to the police. The employee told Brown to leave him alone. To prevent a potential
altercation, the lieutenant stepped between Brown and the employee. Brown grabbed the
lieutenant by the arm to push him out of the way. The lieutenant told Brown not to touch
him or he would arrest Brown. The police cited Brown for assaulting a police officer.
(R. 843-49.) Brown was prosecuted and entered a plea in abeyance. (R. 0562.)
Tired of Brown's abusive and threatening behavior, 45 employees filed a formal
written grievance with the City Administrator against Brown. (R. 839-41.) (Addendum, E.)
The City Administrator was responsible for handling all personnel matters relating to
American Fork City employees. (R. 864.) In the grievance, the employees alleged seven
types of wrongful conduct by Brown:
1.

Brown threatened and intimidated a City employee for voicing his opinion
during a City Council meeting;

2.

Brown attempted to incite a confrontation with employees at City Hall
following a City Council meeting;

3.

Brown assaulted a police officer during the officer's investigation of a
disorderly conduct claim against Brown;

4.

Brown attempted to coerce a City employee into giving a false statement to a
officer;

5.

Brown repeatedly threatened to fire employees for disagreeing with him;
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6.

Brown repeatedly violated City policies and procedures by degrading,
embarrassing and demeaning them in public; and

7.

Brown repeatedly discriminated against, ridiculed, demeaned and coerced
female employees.

(R. 839-41.) None of the defendant employees drafted the grievance. They only signed it.
(R. 872, 868, 860, 857, 836, 833.) Mr. Brown did not sue the author of the grievance.
The employees were at all relevant times employees of American Fork City. (R. 3637.) Each statement in the grievance concerned matters relating exclusively to their
employment with the City, such as how they were treated on the job by City officials.
(R. 839-841.) None of the statements addressed any personal issues the employees may have
had with Brown. (R. 839-841.) Each statement in the grievance raised concerns of the
employees solely in their capacities as employees of American Fork City. (R. 1031.) By
filing the grievance, employees intended to bring Brown's offensive and abusive conduct to
the attention of City officials, and to initiate administrative proceedings against Brown,
thereby putting an end to his bad behavior. (R. 872, 868, 860, 857, 836, 833.) None of the
employees gave a copy of the grievance to any person or entity, other than the City
Administrator, nor did they reveal the contents of the grievance to anyone else. (R. 872, 868,
860, 857, 836, 833.)
The American Fork City Council, not the City Administrator, is responsible for
reviewing complaints about City Council members. Consequently, upon receipt of the
grievance, defendant City Administrator Wanlass forwarded it to the American Fork City
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Council for review. (R. 864.) He never gave a copy of the grievance to anyone other than
the members of the American Fork City Council. (R. 864.)
The Council asked the City Attorney whether under formal written city policies and
procedures the Council had to proceed against Brown. (R. 926.) The City Attorney opined
that the policy and procedure manual did not apply to Councilpersons. (R. 924.) The
Council proceeded no further.
Brown alleged that the Newspaper Defendants defamed him by reporting he
"assaulted" a police officer, and was charged with misdemeanor when he was ultimately
charged with disorderly conduct, an infraction. (R. 29.) The Newspaper defendants got out
on summary judgment because the allegedly defamatory statements were not actionable
because, inter alia, they were true, they did not convey a defamatory meaning and the
damaging impact of any defamatory statement was nominal compared with the damage done
by the truthful statement. (R. 185-86.) Stating that Brown was charged with a misdemeanor
instead of an infraction was not defamatory, because it was "true or substantially true as a
matter of law and, therefore, Brown's claim fails." (R. 1012.) "[T]he Article's inaccurate
reference to the disorderly conduct charge against Brown as a 'misdemeanor' rather than an
'infraction' does not, as a matter of law, render the statement false." (R. 1012.) The trial
court continued, "Such an error in legal terminology cannot serve as the basis for Brown's
defamation claim, particularly where the term 'misdemeanor' is commonly understood to
describe relatively minor, non-felony offenses, an infraction is such an offense, and the
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Article accurately reported the underlying allegation upon which the charge against Brown
was based." (R. 1012.) Brown did not appeal the trial court's ruling.
The employees also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the Petition Clause
of the First Amendment and §§ 63-30-10(2) & 63-30-10(5) of the Governmental Immunity
Act bar Brown's claims.

(R. 832-92 and 1046, p.4.

[Summary Judgment hearing

transcript.]) The employees also argued § 63-30-4(4) of the Act barred his claims against
the employees personally because Brown failed to produce any evidence whatsoever that
they acted with malice. (R. 832-92.) The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment
in favor of the employees. (R. 1029-1032.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The First Amendment's Petition Clause guarantees the right "to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const., amend. 1. It is a near absolute right.
Even without the statutory immunities relied on by the court, this formidable constitutional
right bars plaintiffs claims.
The trial court correctly ruled the Governmental Immunity Act bars Brown's claims
against the employees in their official capacities. Specifically, Utah Code.Ann. § 63-3010(2) preserves immunity for injuries resulting from "abuse of process, libel, [and] slander"
by a governmental employee. Further, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(5) retains immunity for
injuries resulting from the "institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause." The undisputed facts establish the
employees signed the grievance in their capacities as employees, and that all of the
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allegations in the grievance concerned matters relating exclusively to Brown's treatment of
them as City employees. Therefore, signing the grievance was done within the course and
scope of their employment. They are immune from suit in their official capacities.
The trial court also correctly ruled the Act bars Brown's claims against the employees
in their personal capacities.

A governmental employee is not personally liable for acts

occurring within her scope of employment, unless she acts with fraud or malice. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-4(3). The undisputed facts demonstrate the allegations in the grievance were
based upon specific instances of misconduct by Brown and were, therefore, not fraudulent.
Moreover, Brown did not plead specific facts alleging the employees knowingly or recklessly
made a false representations of existing fact about him, nor did he present any evidence to
rebut their testimony that they signed the grievance not to retaliate against Brown, but to end
to his tyrannical, odd behavior. Brown presented no evidence that the employees acted with
fraud or malice, so they are immune from Brown's personal capacity claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PETITION CLAUSE BARS THIS CLAIM.

The First Amendment Petition Clause guarantees the right "to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances," and "protects] any peaceful, lawful attempt to
promote or discourage government action at all levels and branches of government." Pring,
7 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. at 9 (citations omitted). Protected activity includes political advocacy,
lobbying and testifying to the government, writing letters about public matters, public debate,
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and making complaints or reporting violations to governmental bodies. Barker, 26 Loy. L. A.
L. Rev. at 425.
The Petition Clause is part of the panoply of rights which "encourage, promote, and
make it a test of good citizenship for Americans to debate, campaign, lobby, testify,
complain, litigate, demonstrate, and otherwise 'invoke the law' on public issues." Pring, 7
Pace Envtl. L. Rev. at 11 (citation omitted). As one commentator observed:
the petition clause, indeed our entire political system, recognizes
that the "word of the represented" is essential to the way
government shapes our lives
[T]he right is not dependent on
whether the citizens' views are right or wrong, wise or foolish,
public-spirited or venally self interested. Implicit in this
concept is a very modern . . . view of the superior
competitiveness of truth in a free market of ideas. As Justice
Holmes stated in one of his famous dissents, destined to become
the law: "[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached in free
trade in ideas [and] the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.
. . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution."
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)). Another commentator observed that the right to petition is so well-protected
that "courts have universally declared that [even] common-law malice, or ill-will, will not
defeat the petitioning privilege," and that "courts will not interfere with the exercise of the
right... absent sham or fraud, or in some cases, even with sham or fraud." Barker, 26 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. at 427 (citations omitted).
Numerous cases illustrate the broad sweep of the Petition Clause to protect citizens'
rights to petition the government to act or not to act. For example, in Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), trucking
11

companies ("truckers") sued railroads, claiming the railroads conspired to conduct a publicity
campaign designed to foster distaste for truckers and the adoption of laws destructive of the
trucking business.

Id. at 129.

Their activities included lobbymg the governor of

Pennsylvania to veto the "Fair Truck Bill," which would have allowed truckers to carry
heavier loads on Pennsylvania roads. Id. at 130. The trial court and the circuit court held
that the railroads violated antitrust laws with their actions.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, relying primarily on the railroads' first
amendment right to petition. Id. at 143-45. The Court observed that attempts to influence
legislation always results in the party against whom the campaign is made facing potential
injury. Id. It pointed out that:
In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of
government act on behalf of the people and, to a veiy large
extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the
ability of the people to make their wishes known to their
representatives. To hold that the government retains the power
to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same
time, that people cannot freely inform the government of their
wishes would . . . be particularly unjustified.
Id. at 137.

The Court also observed that there is generally only one situation where

petitioning with the purpose of influencing government action might not be protected, i.e.,
where the campaign "is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt
to interfere directly with the business relationship of a competitor." Id. at 144 (emphasis
added).
Four years later, the Court reiterated its support of Petition Clause protections in
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). One of the issues
12

there was a union's petitioning the Secretary of Labor, which a coal company claimed had
resulted in its injury. Id. at 669-672. Relying on Noerr, the Court rejected the idea that the
union could be liable for its actions in petitioning the government. Id. at 671. These cases
comprise the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Significantly, in Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court recognized Noerr and that "[t]he First Amendment protects expressions designed to
influence governmental action even when the content of those expressions brings incidental
injury to parties concerned." Id. at 689. See also Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F.
Supp. 523 (N.D.I11. 1990) (developer's suit against protesting neighbors barred); Lobiondo
v. Schwartz, 733 A.2d at 518-19 (N.J. 1999) (same).
Other courts have likewise relied on the Petition Clause to protect citizens' rights to
communicate on issues of public importance. See Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home,
Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 1988) (defendants' actions in calling nursing
home's violations to attention of state and federal authorities and rousing public interest
protected by Petition Clause and cannot serve as basis for tort liability); Barnes Found, v.
Township of Lower Merlon, 927 F. Supp. 874, 876-78 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (neighbors who met
to discuss and later protest alleged violations of land use ordinances exempt from tort
liability).1

1

See also, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (NoerrPennington doctrine immunizes citizens from liability for exercising right to boycott);
Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (Petition Clause provides
absolute privilege and protects citizens from liability for zoning dispute); Protect Our
Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984) (applying Noerr13

Brown contends that the employees acted with malice and that therefore he states a
claim for relief. These allegations, even if true, do not prove a sham within the meaning of
the Noerr Pennington Doctrine. \n City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499
U.S. 365 (1991), the court held that it was "irrelevant that a petitioning party's political
motives are selfish," because the Petition Clause "shields . . . a conceited effort to
influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose." In Omni, die plaintiff had
alleged that a competitor who had petitioned the government for favorable legislation
spread "untrue and malicious rumors about Omni and attempted to induce Omni's
customers to break their contracts."

Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. at 380.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the competitor's activities were protected by the
Petition Clause. Courts have steadfastly held that the petitioner's intent is irrelevant.
Eastern RR Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Cogeneration, Inc., v. Florida
Power & Light Co., 16 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996); Concourse Nursing Home v. Engelstein,
692 N.Y.S.2d 888 (S.Ct.N.Y. 1999).
Courts across the country reject each and every complaint that Mr. Brown makes
about the employees petitioning activities. For example, false statements made in petitioning
activities are immune under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. Gorman Towers, Inc. v.
Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980); so is labeling the plaintiff a racist, Eaton v.
Newport Bd. ofEduc, 975 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1992); spreading false derogatory rumors,
Pennington doctrine to suit for abuse of process and civil conspiracy).
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Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980); filing groundless
complaints, Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Association, 467 F.Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
acting out of "animus," Associated BodyWorks and Massage Professionals v. AMTA, 897
F.Supp. 1116 (N.D. 111. 1995); accusing plaintiff of not following ordinances, King v.
Township ofEast Lampeter, 17 F.Supp.2d 394 (E.D.Pa. 1998); and communicating ex parte
with legislators, holding secret meetings with officials, and making covert agreements
between petitioners and policy makers, Obernoffv. City and County of Denver, 900 F.2d
1434 (10th Cir. 1990).
The employees' United States constitutional immunity, via the Supremacy Clause,
defeats any state law cause of action. Cheminar Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corporation, 168 F.3d
119 (3d Cir. 1999) (tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective
economic relation, unfair competition and malicious prosecution claims fall to Petition
Clause immunity). Consequently, they have immunity, and every cause of action arising out
of their petitioning activities fails. Associated BodyWorks & Massage Professionals v.
AMTA, 897 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (N.D.I11. 1995) (libel claim fails); Gorman Towers, Inc.
v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (libel claim fails); Kottle v. Northwest Kidney
Centers, 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) (libel claim fails); Cardtoons v. Major League
Baseball Players Assyn., 182 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 1999) (libel claim trumped by
Petition Clause immunity).
The Petition Clause guarantees the rights of citizens to become involved in
government matters, and our form of government depends on this involvement. It is an

1S

affront for Mr. Brown to subject the employees to this harassing litigation simply because
they took advantage of their rights and obligations as citizens. As one court observed, "[t]he
problem is not too much citizen involvement but too little." Brownsville, 839 F.2d at 160.
The employees' summary judgment should accordingly be affirmed.
II.

THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ESTABLISH THE CITY
EMPLOYEES ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES.

To state a defamation claim, plaintiff must prove the allegedly defamatory statements
are not subject to any privilege. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007-08 (Utah
1994). The employees asserted Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-10(2) & (5) provides them with
absolute immunity from Brown's claims. Brown not only failed to establish that the
privileges in these statutes do not apply, but more fundamentally he failed to show any
material issues of fact to preclude summary judgment.
A.

Section 63-30-1 Of2) of the Act Provides Absolute Immunity Against
Brown's Claims.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1953, as amended) expressly retains immunity for
municipal employees and officials for claims "aris[ing] out of, in connection with, or
resulting] from . . . abuse of process, libel, slander . . . [and] infliction of mental anguish .
. . ." This statutory bar is unqualified, and is not defeated by evidence of malice. Brown
admits in his complaint that each of the employees were employed by the City at all relevant
times (R. 36.), and at summary judgment he submitted no evidence to the contrary. The trial
court concluded the employees were acting within the course and scope of their employment
when they signed the grievance and, therefore, § 63-30-10(2) bars his claims. Brown does
16

not challenge this conclusion on appeal On this basis alone, this Court should affirm the
trial court's ruling.
In any event, the court correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1953,
as amended), to bar defamation and emotional distress claims regardless of the underlying
facts, even if they prove malice. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held without further
explanation in Molina v. Spanos, 1999 WL 626126 (10th Cir. 1999), that §63-30-10(2)
barred a plaintiffs against government agents defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims. Molina had asserted that County officials acted with the specific
intent to damage him.
Similarly, in Devlin v. Smalley, 4 F. Supp.2d 1315 (D. Utah 1998), the court held that
§63-30-10(2) barred claims against Sandy City and its officials, both in their representative
and personal capacities, for defamation arising out of the officials' reports of alleged child
abuse to the Division of Child and Family Services. Likewise, in Devlin plaintiff asserted
that defendants acted with malice.
As in Molina and Devlin, it is undisputed that the employees were employed by the
City at all relevant times, and the grievance related solely to the employees' terms and
conditions of employment. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled §63-30-10(2) bars
Brown's claims.
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B.

Section 63-30-10(5) of the Act Provides Absolute Immunity Against
Brown's Claims.

There is immunity for municipal employees and officials against claims "aris[ing] out
o£ in connection with, or resulting] from . . . the institution or prosecution of any judicial
or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause . . ., ." Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10(5) (1953, as amended) (emphasis added). Nothing in the statute requires
that an administrative hearing actually occur. Here the employees signed the grievance to
alert City officials to Brown's offensive and abusive conduct, so the Council would initiate
administrative proceedings against Brown to put an end to his bad behavior. Brown did not
rebut any of that testimony. Based upon these undisputed facts, the trial court concluded
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(5) (1953, as amended) barred Brown's claims.
Brown argues the City's policies and procedures do not give the City Council the
authority to initiate administrative proceedings against a City Council member. However,
state law provides: "The governing body of each municipality may fine or expel any member
for disorderly conduct on a two-thirds vote of the members of the governing body." Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-607. The term "governing body," while not expressly defined in the Act,
has been repeatedly held by Utah courts to be the mayor and the city council. Bellonio v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1996). The council also has the power to remove
a member from office if she is guilty of "oppression, malconduct, misfeasance or
malfeasance in office." Utah Code Ann. §10-3-826 (1953, as amended). Beyond that, the
Petition Clause expressly allows citizens "to petition the Government for a redress of
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grievances." Thus, the City Council had the authority to initiate administrative proceedings
against Brown.
Brown also argues that the City Council never initiated any proceedings relating to
the grievance against him. The fact the City Council, which Brown was a member of, chose
not to initiate an administrative review against Brown, one of their own, is immaterial. The
controlling factor is the employees' intent in signing the grievance, not the council's
technical ability or political resolve to act.
In the end, it is undisputed that the employees thought they were taking proper steps
to improve their working conditions. They alerted City officials to Brown's maltreatment
of them as employees. Although the City Council did not initiate a formal administrative
review or conduct a hearing on the grievance allegations, it did investigate them by asking
the city attorney whether they had to proceed with the grievance. The statements in the
grievance were, therefore, made in connection with the institution of an administrative
proceeding and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(5) (1953, as amended) bars Brown's claims.
Ill

THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ESTABLISH THE CITY
EMPLOYEES ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THEIR PERSONAL
CAPACITIES.

A.

His Fraud Claim Fails.

The trial court correctly held that Brown failed to plead fraud with sufficient
particularity, dismissing the claim. Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that fraud claims be pled with particularity. Brown alleged in his Complaint that the
employees fraudulently signed the grievance, but he never stated with particularly any fraud
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elements. To pleadfraud,plaintiff must specifically allege that the defendant knowingly or
recklessly made a false representation of an existing material fact for the puipose of inducing
reliance thereon, actual reliance reasonable under the circumstances, resulting in injury.
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). Brown failed to do so.
In DeBry, the plaintiffs filed a claim against a Salt Lake County building inspector
alleging the inspector fraudulently issued a building permit for a defective building they
purchased. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' fraud claim as a matter of law pursuant
to § 63-30-4(4) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed
reasoning the plaintiffs "did not allege with specificity that.. . [the inspector] intentionally
or recklessly misrepresented an existing fact to the . . . [plaintiffs]." Id. at 443. The court
continued, "Furthermore, they do not allege that a misrepresentation was made with the
intent of inducing . . . [them] to rely on the representation to their detriment." Id.
Brown asserted only that the allegedly defamatory statements were published with
fraud. He failed, however, to allege specific facts to support his claim. Like the plaintiffs
in DeBry, Brown failed to plead fraud with particularity. Consequently, the trial court
correctly ruled Brown failed as a matter of law to adequately plead his claims for fraud.
Even if Brown had pled fraud with sufficient particularity, the undisputed facts
establish the allegations in the grievance were notfraudulent,and they were grounded in
fact. The employees testified about numerous specific instances when Brown verbally and
physically abused not only them but others as well. He yelled at and threatened them for
doing their jobs, sneered at female employees, and even attempted to humiliate a citizen
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because his wife was one of several employees who filed a class action lawsuit against him.
Brown tried to tell a city employee what he could and could not say during City Council
meetings, threatened him if he did not obey him in the future and told him what to write in
his statement to the police. He also struck a police officer who was investigating the matter,
and otherwise interfered with the officer's investigation. Although he was only charged only
with disorderly conduct, he was also cited for assaulting a police officer.
Brown argues the statement he "assaulted" a police officer is defamatory, because he
was charged with disorderly conduct, not assault. He further argues that charge was
ultimately dismissed. The trial court expressly ruled the Newspaper Defendants' "inaccurate
reference to the disorderly conduct charge against Brown as a 'misdemeanor' rather than an
'infraction' does not, as a matter of law, render the statement false" and that "[s]uch an error
in legal terminology cannot serve as the basis for Brown's defamation claim, particularly
where the term 'misdemeanor' is commonly understood to describe relatively minor, nonfelony offenses, an infraction is such an offense, and the Article accurately reported the
underlying allegation upon which the charge against Brown was based." Brown did not
challenge that ruling and is, therefore, bound by it on appeal.
B.

He Has Not Shown Malice.

The trial court also concluded Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) (1953, as amended) of
the Act barred Brown's claims against the employees in their personal capacities. Section
63-30-4(4) states, "[N]o employee may be held personally liable for acts or omissions
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment,
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or under color of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act
due tofraudor malice." Brown argues the trial court should not have dismissed his claims,
because he presented facts tending to show the employees signed the grievance with malice.
The facts show they intended to bring to the Council's attention Brown's offensive
and abusive conduct and to initiate administrative proceedings against Brown, thereby
putting an end to his inappropriate behavior. They gave the grievance to the City
Administrator, who they believed was responsible for initiating proceedings against Brown.
Brown argues the employees published the grievance to others, but presented no evidence
to contradict their testimony that none of them ever gave a copy of the grievance to any
individual or entity other than the City Administrator or revealed the contents of the
grievance to anyone other than him. The statements in the grievance concerned matters
relating exclusively to their employment with the City, such as how they were treated on the
job by City officials, and did not address any personal issues outside of their employment
that they may have had with Brown. The City Administrator testified the City Council is the
entity responsible for reviewing complaints about City Council members, so he sent the
grievance to them. He never gave a copy of the grievance to anyone other than the members
of the American Fork City Council. Brown failed to present any evidence to the contrary.
To put an end to Brown's abusive and threatening behavior, the employees did what
any employee would do: they told their supervisor. They did so collectively and in writing
to impress upon their "boss" the seriousness of their complaints. Under Brown's argument,
these distinctions make no difference. He would have sued them for slander instead, which
is simply another type of defamation. Taken to a logical conclusion, Brown could sue for

defamation if any of the employees had reported to her boss that Brown sexually harassed
her. This is not they type of communication the law meant to prohibit.
There was simply no evidence, direct or inferred, that the employees signed the
grievance with malice. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled § 63-30-4(4) bars
Brown's claims as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm summary judgment and award
fees and costs to appellees.
DATED this 5 c t a y of July, 2000.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By. /^^<5^^c_
Andrew M. Morse
Heather S. White
Attorneys for Appellees
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ADDENDUM

The following addendum is submitted pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(a)(ll).
A.

United States Constitution, Amendment I

B

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1

C.

Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-10(2) and (5).

D

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-4(3) and (4).

E.

Rule 9, Ut. R. Civ. P.

F.

Grievance

Tab A

Amend. I

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT I

[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable s e a r c h e s a n d seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal a c t i o n s — P r o v i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g — D u e process of l a w and j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t . ]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fi
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
[Rights r e t a i n e d by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, sh
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by •
people.
AMENDMENT X
[ P o w e r s r e s e r v e d to s t a t e s or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by t
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XI
[Suits a g a i n s t s t a t e s — Restriction of judicial power.
The judicial power of the United States shall not be cc
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign Sta;
AMENDMENT XII
[Election of P r e s i d e n t a n d Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vo
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom,
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state wi*
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person vott
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for i
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all pe
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for .
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lis
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat
the Government of the United States, directed to the Pre>
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in th
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open a
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—Th
person having the greatest number of votes for Presiden
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of th
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person ha\
such majority, then from the persons having the highe.numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for a
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immed
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Presiden
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation froi
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose sha
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the stateand a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upo:
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then th
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of th
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—Th
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of th
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, th
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for th
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number c
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall b
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligibl*
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice
President of the United States.
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Section
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory]
27. [Fundamental rights.]
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I. Declaration of Rights
II. State Boundaries
III. Ordinance
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage
V. Distribution of Powers
VI. Legislative Department
VII. Executive Department
VIII. Judicial Department
DC. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
X. Education
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns
XI. Local Governments [Proposed]
XII. Corporations
XIII. Revenue and Taxation
XIV. Public Debt
XV. Militia
XVI. Labor
XVII. Water Rights
XVIII. Forestry
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX. Public Lands
XXI. Salaries
XXII. Miscellaneous
XXIII. Amendment and Revision
XXIV. Schedule

Section 1. [ I n h e r e n t a n d inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of t h a t
right.

Sec. 2. [All political p o w e r inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1896

Sec. 3. [Utah i n s e p a r a b l e from the Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is t h e
supreme law of the land.
1896
Sec. 4.

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people
tf Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.

1896

1896

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
- [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
[Religious liberty] [Proposed.]
5- [Habeas corpus.]
$ [Right to bear arms.]
' [Due process of law.]
*• [Offenses bailable.]
9 [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
;°- [Trial by jury.]
;!• [Courts opetv — Redress of injuries.}
*•• [Rights of accused persons.]
**• [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury]
**• [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
;° [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
;*• [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
;'• [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
;*• [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
;9 [Treason defined — Proof.]
^ [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
•; [Slavery forbidden.]
*^ (Private property for public use.]
y [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
'] [Uniform operation of laws.1
"r [Rights retained by people.]

[ R e l i g i o u s liberty — N o property qualification
to v o t e or h o l d office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public t r u s t or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896
[ R e l i g i o u s liberty.] [Proposed.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
{19991
Sec. 5. [Habeas c o r p u s . ]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [Right to b e a r arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1984 (2nd SJS.)
Sec. 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896

679
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STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
Dvernmental entities is waived for any injury caused from
mgerous or defective condition of any public building,
;ture, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement.
1991

0-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by
negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
imunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
ljury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of
;mployee committed within the scope of employment
pt if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not
the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil
rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without
probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not
it is negligent or intentional;
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any condition existing in connection with an
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity
authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State
Lands;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management
or seeding for the clearing of fog;
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or
natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or
storm systems;
115) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section
41-6-14;
(
16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
^ y highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk,
divert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located
011
them;
(
17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of
^y public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other
P^lic improvement;
(
18) the activities of:
(
a) providing emergency medical assistance;
•b) fighting fire;
(
L') regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous
m
aterials or hazardous wastes;
(
d) emergency evacuations; or
(
e) intervening during dam emergencies; or
.j9> the exercise or performance or the failure to exer? e ° r perform any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter
^ ()r Title 73, Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition
a
'l other immunities granted by law.
1996

63-30-11

63-30-10.5. Waiver of i m m u n i t y for t a k i n g private
property w i t h o u t c o m p e n s a t i o n .
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just compensation.
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according
to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain.
1991

63-30-10.6. Attorneys' f e e s for records requests.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405
and 63-2-802.
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11:
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be filed contemporaneously with a petition
for review under Section 63-2-404; and
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply.
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought
contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a
subsequent action.
1992
63-30-11.

Claim for injury — Notice — Contents —
S e r v i c e — Legal disability.
( D A claim arises when the statute of limitations t h a t
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins
to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as
they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian;
and
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is
against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against
a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a
school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board,
when the claim is against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is
against the State of Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the
executive director, or executive secretary, when
the claim is against any other public board,
commission, or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court
to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental
entity, the court may extend the time for service of
notice of claim.
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STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other
than property damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town,
school district, public transit district, redevelopment
agency, special improvement or taxing district, or other
governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any
right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board,
institution, hospital, college, university, or other instrumentality of the state.
1999
63-30-3. Immunity of g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s from suit.
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury
which results from the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training
program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following
state medical programs and services performed at a
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to
the core of governmental activity in this state and are
considered to be governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or
physician because of the high risk nature of the
patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah
only at a state-owned university hospital or provided
in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned
university acting in the scope of their employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical
facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a
state-owned university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope
of their employment that a court finds is unique or
essential to the core of governmental activity in this
state.
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the
limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may
submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and
the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to
be governmental functions, and governmental entities and
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center
are immune from suit for any injury which results from their
joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title
62A, Chapter 4a.
1991
63-30-4.

Act provisions not c o n s t r u e d as a d m i s s i o n or
denial of liability — Effect of w a i v e r of immunity — Exclusive r e m e d y — J o i n d e r of employee — Limitations o n personal liability.
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be construed as an admission or
denial of liability or responsibility by or for governmental
entities or their employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter,
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by
any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any

provision of this chapter be construed as imposing gfyU
liability or absolute liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as advehaJ*
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental e a S
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federalS?
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an actta
under this chapter against a governmental entity or w
employee for an injury caused by an act or omission" tott
occurs during the performance of the employee's dutift
within the scope of employment, or under color of autW
ity is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other QV3
action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter
against the employee or the estate of the employee who*
act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through
fraud or malice; or
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36(3Xc). 'M; *
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against I
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or
omission complained of is one for which the governniimfaj
entity may be liable, but no employee may be held persQMBt
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the perfonnanci
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment,**
under color of authority, unless it is established that the
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice.
iim
63-30-5.

Waiver of i m m u n i t y as to contractual oblifl*
tions.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entit&Ql
waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising OttUf
contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to jfet
requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13,6Wk
14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.
^
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of ftjfm
Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from •
reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter
26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to deliver w*
contractual amount of water is due to drought, other naturtl
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in tfct
amount of available water.
*im
63-30-6.

Waiver of i m m u n i t y as to actions invofrttl
property.
^
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is w i i j l
for the recovery of any property real or personal or for tw*
possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to
mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any aJ™^*
claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any ttwfr
gage or other lien said entity may have or claim on P»
property involved.
• ^
63-30-7.

Repealed.

m

63-30-8.

Waiver of i m m u n i t y for injury caused vj v*
fective, unsafe, or d a n g e r o u s conditiottjff
h i g h w a y s , bridges, or o t h e r structures.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exo
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from t
all governmental entities is waived for any injury causedI
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway^
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, P*\ ^
viaduct, or other structure located on them.
63-30-9.

Waiver of immunity for injury from d a W ^ J
or defective public building, structuf*
o t h e r public i m p r o v e m e n t — E x c e p t i o D - ^ ^
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the e x C C *55f
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity fromfiKil
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(4) Application of rules to motions, orders, and other papers.
*£ rules applicable to captions, signings, and other matters
^form of pleadings apply to all motions, orders, and other
^pers provided for by these rules.
x) Demurrers, pleas, etc., abolished. Demurrers, pleas, and
o p t i o n s for insufficiency of a pleading shall not be used.

Rule 9

R u l e 9. P l e a d i n g s p e c i a l m a t t e r s .

(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an
organized association of persons that is made a party. When a
party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any
party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the
gale 8. G e n e r a l r u l e s of p l e a d i n g s .
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which
la) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for
shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly
-jief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or
within the pleader's knowledge, and on such issue the party
jkird-party claim, shall contain ( D a short and plain staterelying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; establish the same on the trial.
jDd<2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems
(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differnot know the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact
ent types may be demanded.
in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may be
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short
designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name;
jnd plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall
provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is
jdmit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party
ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended
jelies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to accordingly.
form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown
md this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the parties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties
mbstance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in
are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings
jood faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an
may describe such unknown persons as ttall other persons
iverment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material
unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien
md shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to
* good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto."
pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments
designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally
of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
ieny all the averments except such designated averments or
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally.
intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or
ienial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding plead- occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver
ing, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfac- generally that all conditions precedent have been performed
tion, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall
be made specifically and with particularity, and when so made
legligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure
i consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the
trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurlaches, license, payment, release, res judicata, s t a t u t e of
rence.
feuds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official docu^instituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a
ment or act it is sufficient to aver that the document was
party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim
* a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so issued or the act done in compliance with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a
quires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a
domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or
proper designation.
of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or
d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to
decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to
*hich a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to
render it. A denial ofjurisdiction shall be made specifically and
: ie amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the
with particularity and when so made the party pleading the
"tsponsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all contro*$ponsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
verted jurisdictional facts.
knied or avoided.
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the suffie> Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
ciency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material
I' Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise,
and shall be considered like all other averments of material
tfd direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are
matter.
Quired.
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are
2' A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim
claimed, they shall be specifically stated.
* defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limita*knse or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more
tions it is not necessary to state the facts showing the defense
^tements are made in the alternative and one of them if
but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is
^ l e independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or
^ue insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
describing such statute specifically and definitely by section
^ n a t i v e statements. A party may also state as many
number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designat^Parate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency
ing the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it.
^ whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both.
If such allegation is controverted, the party pleading the
x s
* tatements shall be made subject to the obligations set
statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the
'^h in Rule 11.
cause of action is so barred.
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private stat*' Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so
n
ute of this state, or an ordinance of any political subdivision
*truod as to do substantial justice.

Rule 10
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thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is
sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and
the day of its passage or by its section number or other
designation in any official publication of the statutes or
ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice
thereof,
(j) Libel and slander.
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an
action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts
showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory
matter out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state
generally that the same was published or spoken concerning
the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party
alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial,
that it was so published or spoken.
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or
slander, the defendant may allege both the t r u t h of the matter
charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to
reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves thejustification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating
circumstances.
R u l e 10. Form of p l e a d i n g s and o t h e r p a p e r s .
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary
information.
All pleadings and other papers filed with the court shall
contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title
of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading or
other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall
include the names of all the parties, but other pleadings and
papers need only state the name of the first party on each side
with an indication that there are other parties. A party whose
name is not known shall be designated by any name and the
words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem,
unknown parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons
who claim any interest in the subject matter of the action."
Every pleading and other paper filed with the court shall also
state the name, address, telephone number and bar number of
any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which
information shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first
page. Every pleading shall state the name and address of the
party for whom it is filed; this information shall appear in the
lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading. The
plaintiff shall file together with the complaint a completed
cover sheet substantially similar in form and content to the
cover sheet approved by the Judicial Council.
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim
or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to
a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph
may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings.
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence
and each defense other t h a n denials shall be stated in a
separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates
the clear presentation of the matters set forth.
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading
may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same
pleading or in another pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit
to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and
other papers filed with the court, except printed documents or
other exhibits, shall be typewritten, printed or photocopied in
black type on good, white, ungiazed paper of letter size (8 1/2"
x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches above any
typed material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a
right-hand margin of not less than one-half inch, and a bottom
margin of not less than one-half inch. Ail typing or printing
shall be clearly legible, shall be double-spaced, except for
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matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and shall n$|&
be smaller than pica size. Typing or printing shall a p p e a r ^ ]
one side of the page only.
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed undei'
all signature lines, and all signatures shall be made M:
permanent black or blue ink.
(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk.'
of the court shall examine all pleadings and other papers filejj
with the court. If they are not prepared in conformity with thij|
rule, the clerk shall accept the filing but may require counsel
to substitute properly prepared papers for nonconformi^|T
papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements <#this rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause showilfe
the court may relieve any party of any requirement of tih^^
rule.
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleaiS
ing or paper filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the coiinf
may, upon motion, with or without notice, authorize a codS
thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original.
R u l e 11. S i g n i n g of p l e a d i n g s , m o t i o n s , and other,
pers; r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to court; s a n c t i o n s .
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and ot]
paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in'i
attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represen
by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper sh
state the signer's address and telephone number, if i
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or stab
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.^
unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of<$
signature is corrected promptly after being called to*
attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations
to court. By presenting a plead
written motion, or other paper to the court (whether
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney!!
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of (J
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after4
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, &
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless i
crease in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions the
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous arguBttji
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing lawJ
the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have!
dentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likeljgj
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity^
further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted o n /KB^|
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably bal«fc
on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable oppor
to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has 1
violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated 1
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law 1
or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are respo«
for the violation.
(1) How initiated.
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule i
be made separately from other motions or requests and (
describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision!
It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not b e "
with or presented to the court unless, within 2 i days
service of the motion (or such other period as the court i
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, content]
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately*
rected. If warranted, the court may award to the
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To: Carl Wanlass
From: American Fork City Employees, Departments in General
Date: July 1,1997
RE: Grievance

This memo Is forwarded with the intent to pursue resolution by grievance the following
natters:
\i. issue is the matter of Councilman George. Brown violating employees rights to
reedom of speech in that he did threaten and intimidate an employee of American Fork
Jfty for exercising hisrighta s a citizen to voice an opinion in an open City Council
leeting. That in doing so BROWN has created a hostile environment for all city
mployees who would comment on city issues in open forum where opinions over such
tatters are invited from the public and other interested parties. That ail city employees
tust now be fearful of retaliation for expressing, their views and'beilefe in invited open
rum if those views and beliefs are contrary to those held by Councilman George
•own.
issue Is the assault committed by Councilman George .Brown upon Lieutenant Terry
x pursuant to an'investigation Lieutenant Fox had undertaken concerning the
orderly conduct of George Brown on 6/25/97 in American Fork City Hall. George
)wn had attempted to "browbeat" and incite confrontation with American Fork City
iployees in a public place. .When he attempted to coerce an employee into giving a
fcementto .police that was fevorable to Brown, Lieutenant Foxrightlycorrected
>wn, advising Brown not to tell the employee what to write in the statement
ihcflman Brown then assaulted Lieutenant Fox in an attempt to intimidate him and
trol the information release in the report of disorderly conduct and assaultive
avior by Brown. At issue is the feet that all American Fork City Employees must
be fearful of assaultive behavior from Councilman George Brown if their views and
>ns are contrary to the views and beliefs of George Brown.
sue is ihe repeated threats of terminationfromemployment of American Fork City
(oyees by Councilman George Brown. On numerous occasions George Brown has
itened.terminatian of employment or has told employees to "resign" because the
3yee has disagreed with Browns opinions, views; or politics.
BT, Brown has repeatedly violated American Fork Policy and Procedure
sming personnel problems. Brown has repeatedly degraded, embarrassed,
aned, and insulted American Fork City employees in open public forum, in public
;, and infrontof fellow city workers exposing American Fork City employees to
humiliation and contempt

At issue is the fact that Councilman George Brown has focused his repeated
• demeaning behavior against female staff employees of American Fork City. That he
takes pleasure in makingridiculing,demeaning; and coercing statements towards
female staff in an effort to creat a hostile, abusive, and intimidating work environment
for them.
We therefore issue complaint and grieve the above listed issues and seek relief under.section IX of American Fork City Policy and Procedure. We Grieve the fact that •
Councilman George Brown has violated Utah Criminal Code 76-9-102- Disorderly
Conduct, 76-5-102.4- Assault against a peace officer, and Amencan ForicCity Policy
and Procedures Section Vli (C)(2)- Indulging in Offensive Conduct
Expected Resolution: We demand that American Fork City Councilman'George
Brown be reprimanded by the body of City. Council That he be advised that his. ^
conduct has-adverseiy affected the efficiency, harmony, and good order of Amencan
Fork City employees, and that his actions could reasonably cause the public to lose
confidence in American Fork City Government We demand that American Fork City'
Councilman George Brown, when acting in his capacity as a representative of Amencan
Fork City government be courteous and civil with the public and Amencan Fork-City
Employees. That he not use abusive, indecent course, harsh, loud, or profane
language in any public place, and shall not expose City employees to public humniation
and contempt That he refrain from physically assaultive and intimidating behavior.
This Complaint and Grievance in no way limits individual persons from seeking
for damages, civil and criminal, against George Brown.

